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Sicherheit: Hash-Kollision in duplicity
Aktuelle Meldungen Distributionen
Name: Hash-Kollision in duplicity
ID: FEDORA-2015-2923
Distribution: Fedora
Plattformen: Fedora 22
Datum: Mo, 9. März 2015, 11:20
Referenzen: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8242

Originalnachricht

Name        : duplicity
Product : Fedora 22
Version : 0.6.25
Release : 3.fc22
URL : http://www.nongnu.org/duplicity/
Summary : Encrypted bandwidth-efficient backup using rsync algorithm
Description :
Duplicity incrementally backs up files and directory by encrypting
tar-format volumes with GnuPG and uploading them to a remote (or
local) file server. In theory many protocols for connecting to a
file server could be supported; so far ssh/scp, local file access,
rsync, ftp, HSI, WebDAV and Amazon S3 have been written.

Because duplicity uses librsync, the incremental archives are space
efficient and only record the parts of files that have changed since
the last backup. Currently duplicity supports deleted files, full
unix permissions, directories, symbolic links, fifos, device files,
but not hard links.

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Update Information:

Changes in librsync 1.0.0 (2015-01-23)
======================================

* SECURITY: CVE-2014-8242: librsync previously used a truncated MD4 "strong" check sum to match blocks. However, MD4 is not cryptographically strong. It's possible that an attacker who can control the contents of one part of a file could use it to control other regions of the file, if it's transferred using librsync/rdiff. For example this might occur in a database, mailbox, or VM image containing some attacker-controlled data. To mitigate this issue, signatures will by default be computed with a 256-bit BLAKE2 hash. Old versions of librsync will complain about a bad magic number when given these signature files. Backward compatibility can be obtained using the new `rdiff sig --hash=md4` option or through specifying the "signature magic" in the API, but this should not be used when either the old or new file contain untrusted data. Deltas generated from those signatures will also use BLAKE2 during generation, but produce output that can be read by old versions. See https://github.com/librsync/librsync/issues/5. Thanks to Michael Samuel <miknet.net> for reporting this and offering an initial patch.
* Various build fixes, thanks Timothy Gu.
* Improved rdiff man page from Debian.
* Improved librsync.spec file for building RPMs.
* Fixed bug #1110812 'internal error: job made no progress'; on large
files.
* Moved hosting to https://github.com/librsync/librsync/
* Travis-CI.org integration test at https://travis-ci.org/librsync/librsync/
* Remove bundled copy of popt; it must be installed separately.
* You can set `$LIBTOOLIZE` before running `autogen.sh`, for example on OS X
Homebrew where it is called `glibtoolize`.
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References:

[ 1 ] Bug #1126712 - CVE-2014-8242 librsync: MD4 collision file corruption
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1126712
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This update can be installed with the "yum" update program. Use
su -c 'yum update duplicity' at the command line.
For more information, refer to "Managing Software with yum",
available at http://docs.fedoraproject.org/yum/.

All packages are signed with the Fedora Project GPG key. More details on the
GPG keys used by the Fedora Project can be found at
https://fedoraproject.org/keys
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